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Abstract
We present a general classification of the conditions under which cognitive science,
concerned e.g. with decision making, requires the use of quantum theoretical notions.
The analysis is done in the frame of the mathematical approach based on the theory
of quantum measurements. We stress that quantum effects in cognition can arise only
when decisions are made under uncertainty. Conditions for the appearance of quantum
interference in cognitive sciences and the conditions when interference cannot arise are
formulated.
2
1 Introduction
The special issue, devoted to quantum-like effects in cognition, is certainly, of great interest
giving hope that such formulations could explain a variety of empirical phenomena that do
not find explanations in classical terms. The purpose of the special issue is well described
in the introductory article by Wang, Busemeyer, Atmanspacher, and Photos (2013). All
papers in this issue appeal, in one way or another, to the existence of quantum interference
effects in cognitive phenomena. Thus, the present Comment aims at formulating in precise
mathematical terms under what conditions the interference effects can arise and when they
are prohibited. The clear understanding of these conditions will help avoiding incorrect
interpretations and unnecessary misuse of the quantum formalism.
The idea that human psychological processes could be described by quantum theory was
advanced by Bohr (1933, 1958), who assumed that human cognition, involving deliberations
between several possible actions, could be modeled as a quantum process. Deliberations
between several complementary actions is analogous, Bohr argued, to interference between
several quantum states. Since then, possible interference effects in human decision making
have been discussed in a number of papers that suggested different models for resolving
the so-called paradoxes in classical decision making and suggesting explanations of different
cognitive phenomena. The history of this trend and the related models have been recently
summarized in the book by Busemeyer and Bruza (2012).
As mentioned above, in the papers of the issue, interference is considered as a major
quantum effect required for the explanation of a variety of cognitive phenomena. Even
the order effects arising in different polls are also suggested as being connected with the
manifestation of quantum features in decision making (Wang and Busemeyer, 2013), similarly
to these effects in quantum phenomena.
The typical way of incorporating quantum effects into cognitive phenomena, which is
employed by the majority of authors, is as follows. One first considers some particular
cognitive empirical observations, then constructs a model for their explanation, postulating
the occurrence of interference, and finally fits the model parameters to the same empirical
observations.
This approach however is clearly unsatisfactory as a genuine scientific endeavor since the
models: (a) lack generality, being mostly ad hoc, and (b) cannot claim predictive power as the
same observations that motivated the models are used to qualify them. A real explanation
of cognitive processes must be based on the following three necessary requirements:
(i) There should exist a general theory developed for arbitrary situations. This theory
has to be applicable to any cognitive phenomenon, instead of inventing particular models
for each empirical case.
(ii) The theory has to clearly prescribe the conditions when quantum effects, such as
interference, appear and when they cannot arise. This prevents that interferences are pos-
tulated ad hoc.
(iii) The theory has to be able to make quantitative predictions without fitting parame-
ters. In other words, the process of validation must be developed, which consists in making
novel predictions to empirical situations that have not been previously used to motivate the
theory. Fitting a model to empirical observations can serve only as a first trivial step in the
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whole chain of model validation (Sornette et al., 2007, 2008).
In the next Sec. 2, we give a brief account of such a general theory. In Sec. 3, to
avoid confusion, we specify the terminology and notation employed in defining quantum
events. Section 4 emphasizes the conditions when interference can arise and when it cannot.
Particular models, which are suggested for interpreting cognitive phenomena, are to be tested
against these conditions. Section 5 then considers the Gallup polls treated in the contribution
by Wang and Busemeyer (2013) in the special issue, as an example illustrating our general
classification.
2 Decision making as a measurement procedure
Formulating the theory of quantum measurements, von Neumann (1955) noticed that a
measurement procedure can be interpreted as a logical proposition satisfying the rules of
quantum logic (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936). In quantum measurements, the observable
measurable quantities are defined as the averages of self-adjoint operators from the algebra
of local observables. More precisely, if an observable is represented by an operator Aˆ from
the algebra of local observables, defined on a complex Hilbert space H, then the observable
quantity that can be measured is given by TrρˆAˆ, where the trace is over H and ρˆ is a
positive trace-one operator on H, termed statistical operator, or system state, characterizing
the considered system.
The rigorous definition of quantum probabilities can be done in line with the theory of
quantum measurements. According to the Gleason (1957) theorem, a quantum probability
measure has a unique extension to a positive linear functional defined for any bounded linear
operator on a Hilbert space having a dimension larger than two, so that, if A is a proposition,
then the related quantum probability is uniquely given by TrρˆAˆ. Quantum probabilities,
under different axiomatics, have been studied in a number of publications (Pitowsky, 1989).
The achievable accuracy of quantum measurements has been analyzed by Dyakonov (2012).
Psychological problems in the interpretation of quantum measurements have been discussed
by Mermin (2012).
The most general and mathematically rigorous way of developing decision theory with
quantum probabilities is not by constructing some particular models, but by following the
general theory of quantum measurements. Such a quantum decision theory has been recently
advanced (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008) and developed in a series of papers (Yukalov and
Sornette, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). This theory uniquely defines the conditions,
when the interference effects can arise and when they do not occur. To explain this, we need
to give a brief sketch of the approach, omitting mathematical details that can be found in
the cited papers.
Consider a given set of prospects pij , forming a complete lattice
L = {pij : j = 1, 2, . . . , L} ,
where the prospects are ordered by means of their probabilities, to be given below. Each of
the prospects is represented in a Hilbert space H as a vector |pij〉. The prospect operators on
H, defined as
Pˆ (pij) ≡ |pij〉〈pij| , (1)
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play the role of the operators of observables. Note that the prospect operators are not
required to be either orthogonal or to be projectors. A decision maker is characterized by a
decision-maker state ρˆ on H. The observable quantities, given by the averages
p(pij) ≡ TrρˆPˆ (pij) , (2)
define the prospect probabilities. Note that the state ρˆ can be either pure, if the decision
maker is isolated, or mixed, when the decision maker interacts with a surrounding society
(Yukalov and Sornette, 2012).
Accomplishing the trace operation in definition (2), and separating the diagonal and
non-diagonal terms, results in the expression
p(pij) = f(pij) + q(pij) , (3)
where the first term corresponds to the diagonal representation, while the second term gives
the off-diagonal contribution. The latter term is caused by quantum interference, so that we
refer to it as the interference factor or coherence factor.
According to the generalized correspondence principle, first advanced by Bohr (1913)
when analyzing atomic spectra, quantum theory must reduce to classical theory in the limit
where quantum effects become negligible. In the more general version, the quantum-classical
correspondence principle is understood as the requirement that the results of quantum mea-
surements would be reducible to those of classical measurements when the quantum effects,
such as interference, vanish. This reduction is called decoherence (Wheeler and Zurek, 1983;
Zurek, 2003).
By the quantum-classical correspondence principle, the quantum probability, which is
a measurable quantity, has to reduce to the classical probability, when the interference
(coherence) factor tends to zero:
p(pij)→ f(pij) , q(pij)→ 0 . (4)
Therefore, the diagonal term f(pij) corresponds to the classical probability. The latter can
be understood as a frequentist probability associated with the utility factor representing the
objective utility of the prospect.
The interference term q(pij) is caused by the quantum nature of probability (2). In
decision theory, this term represents the subjective inclinations of a decision maker caused
by his/her emotions as well as possible behavioral biases, because of which it can also be
called the attraction factor.
It is clear that subjective feelings can vary in a wide range, being rather different for
different decision makers. Even for the same decision maker, under the same conditions,
with the same information, but at different times, subjective feelings often change (Anderson
et al., 1992; Anand et al., 2010). This, it seems, would make it impossible to quantify the
attraction factor. However, it has been shown (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b,
2011) that the attraction factor, arising in the definition of quantum probability (2), enjoys
the following general properties. It varies in the interval
− 1 ≤ q(pij) ≤ 1 . (5)
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The following alternation condition holds:
L∑
j=1
q(pij) = 0 . (6)
And the average absolute value of the aggregate attraction factor can be estimated by the
quarter law:
1
L
L∑
j=1
|q(pij)| =
1
4
, (7)
provided not all terms are zero.
As has been shown in our papers (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009a, 2009b, 2011), the quarter
law holds true in a variety of experimental observations with a very good accuracy. However
it is important to emphasize that this quarter law is not merely an empirical fact, but it
can be theoretically derived as a non-informative prior (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009b, 2011).
Because of the importance of the quarter law for quantitative prediction, we briefly sketch
its derivation. Recall that the attraction factor q is, generally, different for different decision
makers, being in that sense a random quantity. Let ϕ(q) be a distribution of the attraction
factor over the manifold of attraction factors corresponding to a large set of decision makers
and/or of their mental states. According to the factor range (5), the distribution ϕ(q) is to
be normalized over the domain [−1, 1] and has to satisfy the alternation condition (6), so
that ∫
1
−1
ϕ(q) dq = 1 ,
∫
1
−1
ϕ(q)q dq = 0 .
Then the values
q+ ≡
∫
1
0
ϕ(q)q dq , q
−
≡
∫
0
−1
ϕ(q)q dq ,
in view of the alternation condition, are related as q+ + q− = 0. The absence of any a priori
information implies that the distribution ϕ(q) is uniform. Then the normalization condition
yields ϕ(q) = 1/2. As a result, from the above definition, we have q+ = 1/4 and q− = −1/4.
Thus, the non-informative prior for the absolute value of the aggregate attraction factor is
1/4.
These properties make it straightforward to give quantitative predictions, without any
fitting parameters, for the behavior of decision makers. For instance, it is easy to give
quantitative explanations for classical paradoxes in decision making, such as the disjunction
effect or the conjunction fallacy (Yukalov and Sornette, 2009b, 2011).
3 On terminology and notation for quantum events
Defining quantum events or quantum measurements, one has to be accurate with terminology
and notation that may differ in the works of different authors. To avoid misunderstanding,
it is necessary to provide some precisions on our terminology and notations. We shall be
very brief, not going into mathematical details that can be found in the cited papers.
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In quantum theory, an event A is represented by a self-adjoint operator Aˆ. For defining
the probability of the event, one usually interprets the latter operator as a projector. There
are then two ways of introducing quantum probabilities.
One way is to consider all operators, representing events, being defined on the same
Hilbert space H, with the system state ρˆ. Then the probability of each event A is p(A) =
TrρˆAˆ, with the trace over H. For two disjoint events, say A and B, their union A
⋃
B is
represented by the sum of the orthogonal operators Aˆ + Bˆ acting on H. The probability of
this union p(A
⋃
B) is the sum p(A) + p(B).
One calls the events disjoint, or mutually exclusive, or orthogonal, such that A
⋂
B =
0, when the related operators are mutually orthogonal projectors. In classical probability
theory, the disjoint events are often termed as incompatible. The latter term, however, has
a different meaning in quantum theory, where one calls incompatible, or incommensurable,
such events whose related operators do not commute. And events are named compatible,
or commensurable, when their operators commute. Therefore, to avoid confusion, we shall
use the term disjoint for the orthogonal events, such that A
⋂
B = 0, while we shall call the
events compatible when [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0. Respectively, two events are incompatible, if the related
operator commutator [Aˆ, Bˆ] is not zero.
In the procedure of quantum measurements of two incompatible observables, say A and
B, the order of their measurement is important, so that measuring A
⋂
B, generally, is not
the same as measuring B
⋂
A. In order to avoid ambiguity, it is necessary to emphasize that,
according to the standard notation accepted in quantum theory, the order of operations is
understood as being accomplished from right to left. That is, when one writes the operations
as AˆBˆ, one assumes that Bˆ acts first, while Aˆ acts second. This order of actions is natural
for quantum theory where actions are represented by operators acting on functions from
a Hilbert space. Thus, the product of operators AˆBˆ, acting on a function ψ, is uniquely
defined as Aˆ · Bˆψ ≡ Aˆ(Bˆψ). We always use this standard definition.
There exists the well known problem in defining the joint probability of two incompat-
ible events. In this respect, it has been shown (Niestegge, 2008) that the quantum joint
probability p(A
⋂
B) can be correctly defined either for compatible events, for which Aˆ and
Bˆ commute, or for incompatible events by assigning the operators to the Jordan algebra,
where the operator product Aˆ · Bˆ is given by the Jordan symmetric form (Aˆ · Bˆ + Bˆ · Aˆ)/2.
However, such a symmetric definition of the joint probability possesses the properties of the
classical probability yielding no interference terms.
When an event A occurs after an event B, then, instead of the joint probability, one
considers the transition probability defined as the product of the Lu¨ders projection-rule
probability of successive measurements pL(A|B) and the probability p(B). This transition
probability was first introduced by Wigner (1932), so that one can denote it as pW (A|B) =
pL(A|B)p(B). It is this Wigner transition probability that is used by Wang and Busemeyer
(2013). The Lu¨ders probability is often interpreted as an extension to the quantum region
of the classical conditional probability. However, when the events A and B are represented
by one-dimensional orthogonal projectors, the Lu¨ders form pL(A|B) is symmetric, such that
pL(A|B) = pL(B|A). Contrary to this, the classical conditional probabilities are not symmet-
ric. Therefore, the Lu¨ders form cannot be treated as an extension of the classical conditional
probability. As a consequence, the Wigner transition probability cannot be accepted as an
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extension of the joint probability.
There is another way of introducing quantum probabilities for several events, which
is free of the problem of defining the joint probabilities. In this approach, each event A is
represented by a proposition operator Aˆ acting on a Hilbert space HA. Respectively, another
event B is represented by an operator Bˆ acting on a Hilbert space HB. The system state is
defined by a statistical operator ρˆAB acting on the tensor-product space HAB ≡ HA
⊗
HB.
The probability of a separate event p(A) ≡ TrρˆABAˆ, with the trace over the tensor product
HAB, reduces to the previous definition above.
The sequence of two events A and B is called a composite event and is denoted by A
⊗
B
or simply as AB, and is represented by the tensor-product operator Aˆ
⊗
Bˆ acting on HAB.
By this definition, the joint probability of these two events is p(AB) = TrρˆABAˆ
⊗
Bˆ, with
the trace over the tensor-product space HAB. It is this definition of composite events that
we have used from the very beginning in our approach to quantum decision theory (Yukalov
and Sornette, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Further mathematical information
on the properties of composite events can be found in the literature (Holevo, 1973; Wilce,
1992; Niestegge, 2004; Harding, 2009).
In the majority of cases studied in experiments performed in cognitive sciences, one
considers the situation where the prospect lattice is formed by just two prospects, pi1 = A1B
and pi2 = A2B, where B ≡ {B1, B2} is represented as a set of two possible actions (or
events), B1 and B2. By the general theory, for this case, the prospect states are given by
|pij〉 = |Aj〉
⊗
|B〉. The prospect probabilities are
p(AjB) = p(AjB1) + p(AjB2) + q(AjB) , (8)
where j = 1, 2. The first two terms, whose sum is f(AjB) = p(AjB1) + p(AjB2), are the
classical joint probabilities that are uniquely defined through the conditional probabilities:
p(AiBj) = p(Ai|Bj)p(Bj). (9)
Hence, the interference term (attraction factor) is
q(AjB) = p(AjB)− p(AjB1)− p(AjB2) . (10)
The alternation condition (6) now reads as q(A1B) = −q(A2B), and the quarter law (7)
becomes |q(A1B)|+ |q(A2B)| = 1/2.
Interference effects exist only when the interference factor (10) is not zero. Only then,
there is the necessity of invoking quantum notions for cognitive phenomena. When this
factor is zero, there is no interference effects and all cognitive phenomena can be described
with a classical formalism.
4 Interference appears in decisions under uncertainty
As has been mentioned, postulating the existence of interference effects may lead to incorrect
conclusions, since interference does not necessarily occur for any prospect. Let us now clarify
this and formulate the conditions under which interference cannot arise and those when it
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can. These conditions follow from the general theory delineated above. The mathematical
details can be found in our earlier publications (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009a, 2009b,
2010b, 2011).
Prospects are composed of elements that, depending on applications, may be called
events (in probability theory), propositions (in logic), measurements (in natural sciences),
or decisions and actions (in decision theory). Keeping this in mind, we use the term “event”.
(i) Simple events.
A simple event Ai is such that it cannot be represented as a union or conjunction of
several events. There is no interference for a simple event:
q(Ai) = 0 .
(ii) Unions of mutually disjoint simple events.
Let
⋃
iAi be a union of mutually disjoint simple events Ai all represented by orthogonal
projectors on the same space H. There is no interference for this union:
q
(⋃
i
Ai
)
= 0 .
(iii) Factorized composite events.
An event is composite if it can be represented as a conjunction of several events as defined
above. A composite event is factorized if it is a conjunction
⊗
iAi of simple events Ai, whose
representing operators Aˆi are defined each on its own space Hi. There is no interference for
these factorized composite events:
q
(⊗
i
Ai
)
= 0 .
(iv) Entangled composite events.
A composite event is entangled if it cannot be represented as a factorized event. An
example of an entangled event is AiB, where B = {B1, B2}, so that the prospect state is
|Ai〉
⊗
|B〉. Interference can occur only for entangled events. For illustration, let us recall
the double-slit experiment in physics. A particle is emitted in the direction of a screen
having two slits. From another side of the screen, there are detectors registering the arrival
of the particle. Let the registration of the particle by an i-detector be denoted as Ai and the
passage of the particle through one of the slits be denoted as B1 or B2, respectively. When
the passage of the particle through a slit Bj is certain, then the event AiBj is factorized
and displays no interference, with the event probability given by p(AiBj) and the vanishing
factor q(AiBj).
However, when it is not known through which of the slits the particle passes, then the
event AiB, is entangled and demonstrates interference, that is, a nonzero factor q(AiB),
giving rise to the remarkable quantum effect of interference fringes, or periodic modulations
of the probability of finding the particle along the dimension of the screen.
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5 Is there anything quantum in Gallup polls?
As an application of the above analysis, let us consider the Gallup polls treated in the
contribution by Wang and Busemeyer (2013). In accordance with the considerations we
have presented above, this contribution is the most interesting, since it attempts to give an
explanation for the necessity of involving quantum notions in order to interpret empirical
tests, such as Gallup polls, without introducing fitting parameters.
The Gallup polls, demonstrating order effects, have been described by Moore (2002).
In the polls, conducted in September 6, 1997, the respondents were asked to answer the
questions of the following type: ”Do you generally think Clinton (Gore) is honest and trust-
worthy?” The questions were asked in two separate contexts: non-comparative and com-
parative. The non-comparative context for a question occurs when that question is asked
first, without any mention of the other item. The comparative context for a question occurs
when that question is asked after the other question in the pair, so that the second question
may be influenced by the response to the first question. The Gallup polls, as described
by Moore, have demonstrated noticeable order effects. Thus, when respondents were asked
about Clinton first, 50% said he was honest and trustworthy. When the other group of the
sample was asked about Gore first, 68% said he was honest and trustworthy. However, in
the comparative context, when the question about Clinton was asked second, 57% said he
was honest. And when the question about Gore was asked second, 60% said he was honest.
This demonstrated the questions-order effect, or more precisely, the difference between the
comparative and non-comparative contexts.
At this point, it is worth noting that these numbers, to our mind, should not be treated as
having absolute value. They are actually to a large extent rather random. For instance, the
responses to the same questions about Clinton and Gore, given at very close times, fluctuated
around 50% for both of them, since, generally, people did not see much difference between
these two democrats furthermore associated in the US Administration as president and vice-
president respectively (Gallup poll, 1997). For example, in the Gallup poll of October 3, 1997,
Clinton was considered as honest by 56% of respondents and Gore, by 47%, which shows a
relation opposite to the previous September poll, when respondents classified Gore as being
more honest than Clinton. And in the poll of October 30, 1997, Clinton was considered
honest by 62% of respondents, while Gore, by 53%, again with a relation opposite to the
September poll. This shows that these polls exhibit very strong fluctuations with time.
While, at each fixed poll, the order effects were found to be statistically significant (Moore,
2002), this does not contradict the fact that a poll as a whole can be random, displaying
different data at close times, when the external conditions are practically the same.
The typical structure of the polls is as follows. Respondents first answer a question
B, choosing either B1 or B2, and after this, answer a question A, choosing either A1 or
A2. Suppose a population of N respondents is interrogated. Answering the question B,
a part N(Bi) answers Bi, with N(B1) + N(B2) = N . The corresponding fractions give
the unconditional frequentist probabilities p(Bj) = N(Bj)/N . Then each part N(Bj) of
the population is questioned on A, which separates the population into the subpopulations
N(Ai|Bj) of those who answer Ai under the condition that before they have answered Bj .
Clearly, N(A1|Bj)+N(A2|Bj) = N(Bj). The related fractions define the classical conditional
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probabilities p(Ai|Bj) = N(Ai|Bj)/N(Bj), satisfying the standard normalization for classical
conditional probabilities p(A1|Bj)+p(A2|Bj) = 1. Classical joint probabilities can be defined
as p(AiBj) = p(Ai|Bj)p(Bj). In the same way, the other group of respondents is interrogated,
first on A and then on B, giving the classical probabilities p(BjAi).
The classical joint probabilities are symmetric, so that p(AiBj) = p(BjAi) should hold.
But the Gallup polls have shown that this is not always the case. To explain the order
effects, Wang and Busemeyer (2013) suggested to treat p(AiBj) as the Wigner transition
probability pW (Ai|Bj) = pL(Ai|Bj)p(Bj). Their main result, that they call the ”q-test”, is
the demonstration that the so interpreted probabilities satisfy the equality
p(A1B2) + p(A2B1) = p(B1A2) + p(B2A1) , (11)
which is in good agreement with the Gallup polls.
However, to satisfy this equality, there is no need to resort to quantum notions. This is
because Eq. (11) is also valid for classical probabilities due to their symmetry. Therefore,
the validity of this test, as such, does not prove yet the quantum origin of the phenomenon.
What is specific for the Gallup polls is not this equation, but the asymmetry of the related
frequentist probabilities. That is, the proof would be if it could be possible to calculate
somehow quantum probabilities pquantum(AiBj) and to show that they coincide with the
empirical frequencies p(AiBj).
The events Ai or Bj , from the mathematical point of view defined above, are not en-
tangled. Consequently, the corresponding probabilities p(Ai) and p(Bj), according to our
classification, involve no interference. Thus, we are not convinced of the need to invoke in-
terference effects to explain Gallup polls, due to a lack of genuine uncertainty in the related
decision making. While Wang and Busemeyer (2013) mention that the questions posed in
the polls can contain some kind of uncertainty, the general theory that we have outlined
above specifies rigorously the type of uncertainty that ensures the existence of interference:
it is the mathematically defined uncertainty related to the occurrence of entangled composite
events. In the absence of such events, there can be no interference terms. The analysis of
the order effects by Wang and Busemeyer (2013) is certainly of interest. However, it remains
unclear why the Gallup polls would require quantum interpretation.
In conclusion, the rigorous approach, based on the theory of quantum measurements,
allows us to find the conditions when quantum effects, such as interference, can appear in
cognitive sciences. Possible occurrence of quantum effects in cognitive empirical tests should
be checked against these conditions. Generally, quantum effects can arise only when one
makes decisions under uncertainty, in the presence of entangled composite events.
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